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ABSTRACf 
Like 'altruism', benevolence or the concern for another, when it is 
practised unmixed and in the absence of all other concerns except means-
ends "rationality", can be a highly dangerous virtue. Once generalized in 
the pursuit of the greater good, unmixed benevolence all too easily finds 
itself constrained - in the words of Philippa Foot - to 'sanction the 
automatic sacrifice of the one for the good of the many'. 
What then must curb or direct benevolence? Scarcely sympathy, 
which is only the catalyst for benevolence and open (in the shape of 
"sympathy with the general interest") to the same perversion of the 
originary source as is benevolence. Hardly fraternity either (or so the 
Lecture contends). Against benevolence and beyond benevolence, 
Philippa Foot herself appeals to 'a kind of solidarity between human 
beings- as if there is some sense in which no-one is to come out against 
one of his fellow men'. 
In a refinement and further development of Foot's proposal, but 
pressing into service (I) Simone Weil's conception of human recognition 
of the human, (2) David Hume's conception of'the party ofhumankind', 
and (3) the resources of the Roman law relating to agreements in solido 
(agreements in respect of the entirety of something), the Lecture seeks to 
show what explanatory power and precision will be added to the genealogy 
of morals by the acknowledgement of a primitive response of solidarity 
keyed to the human recognition of the human. In identifying the all-
important negative thing that any human being owes to any or all other 
human beings, namely the solidum that is presupposed to the ordinary 
morality of all interaction between human beings, such an 
acknowledgement places limits upon claims that may be entered on behalf 
of aggregative reasoning. It assists in the demarcation of the proper 
province and operation ofHumean 'humanity, benevolence, friendship, 
public spirit and other social virtues of that stamp'. It makes space for a 
category (passed over by Hume) of the forbidden and it grounds the 
defences of the solidum at the root of the ethical. In a further refinement 
of these ideas, the same acknowledgement explains the sacredness that 
Hume himself attaches to consent. It vindicates in neo-Humean terms the 
profound misgivings we are occasioned by the ordinary workings of 
consequentialist practical thinking, by its impoverished ideas of agency 
and responsibility, and by the actuality of the domestic policies and 
international development policies with which consequentialist thinking 
has been so closely associated. 
"Always there will be winners and losers", the saying goes. But let 
us distinguish here between a truism and a shameless disavowal of 
responsibility for acts or policies which, in assailing the solidum, menace 
the inmost core of morality. The Lecture distinguishes sharply between 
the general and the universal demands of solidarity, which arise from the 
inmost core of the ethical, and all other however persuasive demands. 
Finally, echoing claims by Nietzsche against the mentality of globalism 
yet respecting the claims of true internationalism, the Lecture seeks to 
restore the claims ofthe local and the personal. 
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I. Looking back at the earlier seventeen nineties in France, 
Chateaubriand writes 
It was a point of honour for the co11ventiollnels [the 
sworn members of the National Convention, which 
governed France from 21 September 1792 till October 
26'b, 1795] that they were the most benevolent of men. 
Like good fathers, good sons, good husbands, they 
walked out with small children. They behaved like 
nannies. They wept fondly at the simple games the 
little ones played. They took the little lambs in their 
arms and dandled them in gentle imitation of the gee-
gee which pulled the tumbril that took the victims of 
the Revolution to their final end. The conventionnels 
sang of Nature, of Peace, of Pity, of Beneficence, of 
Plain Speaking or Artless Simplicity, and of Domestic 
Virtue. It was with deep compassion that these devotees 
of philanthropy had their neighbours beheaded for the 
sake of the greater happiness of the human race. 
Mhnoires d'outre-tombe, IX, ch. 3 (ad fin). 
Chateaubriand might have asked why the conventionnels allowed 
themselves to be persuaded that the most dangerous enemies of the 
Revolution were traitors within - or their own neighbours. He should 
have spent more effort on that question. But in our citation the thing that 
moves him to the scorn that culminates in his last sentence is the mismatch 
between the conventionnels • preoccupation with their own benevolence 
and their repeated acquiescence in judicial killing justified only (if at all) 
in the name of the greatest happiness. 
• In thanking the Unh·ersity of Kansas for the in\·itation to give the Lindley 
Lecture. I want to add special thanks to John Bricke and Thomas Tuozzo for that 
which I learned in the special ambience of the Philosophy Depanment at Lawrence: 
and to explain that in staning out from two thoughts which I have pressed into 
service more than once before, one from Philippa Foot and the other from Simone 
Weil, my purpose is to extend substantially and to correct that which I have 
previously built upon their work. 
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What is the mismatch exactly? Benevolence seeks the happiness of 
others or resents the misery of others. But, if so, then it may seem that a 
thoroughgoing and fully rational benevolence must hold that, in the 
fulfilment of its commitment to the greatest happiness, no person's 
happiness or misery must matter more than the happiness or misery of 
anyone else - or, as Bentham puts it, "every individual tells for one; no 
individual for more than one". Any other principle for the assessment of 
acts to be undertaken in the name of what one sincerely believes is the 
greatest happiness, would be less productive of happiness, it might be 
said, and less just. The conventionnels felt compassion for the victims 
on the tumbrel- how could they help but do so?- but it would have been 
inconsistent with their thoroughgoing benevolence for them to go further. 
It would have been inconsistent because the only justice and the only 
concern for another that is knowable by unmixed, unconstrained rational 
benevolence is gathered up already in the impartiality of a concern 
extended to anyone and everyone in the systematic determination of the 
greatest happiness. Apparently then Chateaubriand's aspersions are 
misdirected. Either that, or else (as I should say) we must find a better 
understanding of benevolence. 
2 Is this the mismatch? - that sincere or genuine or real 
benevolence presupposes something which guides or directs it and directs 
it, wherever applicable, into an indelibly compassionate or indignant 
concern for the victims of judicial murder, wrongful indictment, 
expropriation, dispossession, unprovoked violence .... As properly 
directed in cases such as those Chateaubriand is recalling, the concern 
for another needs to have an import that cannot be diminished or dwarfed 
in relation to other preoccupations, least of all in relation to the 
abstractions of aggregative calculation.• (Do not such abstractions 
themselves deserve the suspicion of true benevolence?) A name that is 
ready to hand for a care that seeks in this way to occupy itself with the 
fate of any and every individual is "solidarity", the solidarity of the human 
qua human. True benevolence cannot dispense with it. 
By origin "solidarity" is a term of Roman Law. In a non-legal or 
ethical sense, the use of the word effectively postdates the events 
Chateaubriand is concerned with2• So it might be suggested that a better 
term for that in which he finds the conventionnels deficient would be 
fraternity- as in Mirabeau's famous utterance: 
General liberty (liberte genera/e) will rid the world of 
the absurd oppressions that overwhelm humanity. It 
will give rise to a rebirth of that universal brotherhood 
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without which all public and private benefit is so 
uncertain and precarious.} 
But fraternity is at best an approximation to what we need in order to 
name the feeling-deficit that is signalled by Chateaubriand's irony- not 
least because, so soon as we make serious use of the metaphor of 
brotherhood, we encounter the difficulty that a brother or sister owes 
another brother or sister (as such) special or particular consideration; 
and special or particular consideration is not something one can extend 
to absolutely everyone or just anyone. 
With fraternity- as with the aspiration for equality and as with true 
benevolence, once we press these ideas for some key to the purport 
intended- collateral ideas need to be present. These further ideas may or 
may not have been familiar to the lovers of fraternity or equality, who may 
or may not have had names for them; but provided these further ideas are 
attuned to recognizable sentiments or responses of ordinary human beings, 
their previous non-articulation need not matter. Solidarity in particular-
if this is to be the focus of our search for that which needs to direct 
benevolence- is as old as the hills (see also section 14 below).lt is of no 
consequence if there was scarcely any conscious conception of it before 
a vague and inexplicit idea of some such thing was forced upon the 
actors and witnesses to the events of the 1790s (and/or upon their 
inheritors) by the limitless duplicity of the slogans of revolution. 
The real impediment to our search for a better understanding of the 
solidarity in which the conventionnels were deficient lies elsewhere. It 
lies in the fact that both word and idea have signified such a large variety 
of things for such a variety of people who have adhered to such a motley 
of persuasions.'ln the period between 1848 and the Great War, for instance 
(many decades, that is, after the word had taken on an ethical sense), the 
idea of solidarity came to be allied with socio-political notions of quasi-
contract, State Socialism, mutual assurance or nice mediation between 
the claims of economic liberalism and socialism (anti-individualist 
liberalism. or anti-collectivist socialism. or whatever). But let us try to 
abstract from this multiplicity by searching for a demand which is 
antecedent to all inclination, theory or collective aspiration, arises from 
the simplest sort of ethical thinking and looks for the kind of response 
that might be expected from almost anyone who is party to the ethical. 
3. In that cause. and moving from the historical to that which is 
almost timeless, let us narrow the search with a thought that Philippa 
Foot has made explicit within analytical philosophy in the following 
characterization: 
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The existence of a morality which refuses to sanction 
the automatic sacrifice of the one for the good of the 
many . . . secures to each individual a kind of moral 
space, a space which others are not allowed to invade. 
Nor is it impossible to see the rationale of the principle 
that one man should not want evil, serious evil, to come 
on another, even to spare more people the same loss. It 
seems to define a kind of solidarity between human 
beings, as if there is some sense in which no one is to 
come out against one of his fellow men. In both cases, 
the good of the rule is a good that comes from having a 
system. But the justification is not, as with rules that 
limit the direct pursuit of the general good in utilitarian 
systems, that those who accept them will be most likely 
actually to bring about [most welfareV 
Here Foot gives voice to the disquiet we are caused by conceptions of 
agency and responsibility that arise from the political or philosophical 
mechanization of human benevolence. In philosophy, as also in life, the 
present day inheritor of these conceptions has been moral 
consequentialism. This founds ethical decision on the evaluation of 
alternative •outcomes' yet, in the business of identifying and assessing 
these alternatives, either excludes ethical!deontological ideas or else 
prescinds from their distinctive force. 6 Disquiet persists. The 
philosophical task is to see how close we can come to its source and to 
remind ourselves of anything we can discover that we know already 
about how the solidarity Foot postulates sits within ethical thought as a 
whole. 
One way to proceed (in a possible variation upon Foot's later work, 
Natural Goodness, Oxford 2006) is to single out a well-understood 
genealogy of morals that makes no use of the idea of solidarity, to count 
up the merits and demerits of the morality that this genealogy "defines" 
or determines, and ask a question: would this morality minister better to 
the truly irrevocable cares and concerns of human existence, and would 
the said genealogy gain in verisimilitude, if room were made for this thing 
we are following Foot in calling solidarity? Should the genealogist be set 
the task of identifying its primitive basis in human nature? 
4. In furtherance of that plan, I sketch Hume's theory, complete or 
incomplete, of the genesis of morals, and of the roots of the ethical in 
human nature. 
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In human beings, there is a weak but fortifiable sentiment of 
benevolence and an ever-present yet pliant and adaptable sentiment of 
self-Jove.7 Between these mutually irreducible sentiments there is a 
constant interplay. Each and every one of us is prompted by self-love (as 
also by benevolence) to promote the benevolence of each and everyone 
else; and each and everyone seeks constantly to diminish each and 
everyone else's private concern to attend only to self-love. In succession 
to this interplay, the words 'useful', 'useless', 'good', 'bad', 'fair', 'foul', 
'ugly' and 'beautiful' ... take on a public and shareable significance which 
comes to transcend any particular person's private and particular situation. 
From this and concomitant processes there emerges- under the innuence 
of imagination, reason and sympathy (the reverberation of one human 
being to the psychological state of another) - a nascent standard of 
morals. Once established, that standard informs the evaluation of 
dispositions or characters and shapes judgment upon actions that are 
expressive of them. At the same time it sustains the first understanding of 
vice and virtue. Pari passu, the grasping of the standard and its entry 
into human thought and speech extends, reinforces and relines the 
motivation to act otherwise than simply from self-love. 
In the important class of cases from which the Humean construction 
starts out- namely the so-called natural virtues, which do not presuppose 
artifice or co-ordination (but do include the disposition for gratitude)-
the emergent standard is only recognizing as a norm that which is already 
latent within our nature: 'A parent nies to the relief ofhis child; transported 
by that natural sympathy which actuates him and which affords no leisure 
to renect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like 
circumstances' (paragraph 2 of Appendix Three, Enquiry into the 
Principles of Morals, Selby Bigge, 307). At the next stage, and under the 
continuing guidance of imagination, reason and sympathy, come 
"humanity, benevolence, friendship, public spirit and other social virtues 
ofthat stamp" (Enquiry, Selby Bigge, p. 204).8 
That is one enlargement of the proto-ethical. In parallel and in response 
to a sense of the need to concert human efforts, there is another and co-
equal enlargement. The benefits in prospect from co-ordination divert 
self-love from immediate into longer-term prospects and enlarge the scope 
of benevolence. Thus there emerge various con-ventions or con-
currences9 culminating in co-ordinating norms by the observance of which 
we gain an indispensable shared benefit and in the living of which we can 
come to find something we are moved to call moral beau(v. (Compare 
Treatise III.ii. 2.) These observances mark the recognition of various so-
called artificial virtues and acts (the as-if-compact-involving virtues and 
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acts) of honesty, loyalty, allegiance to magistrates of state, fidelity to 
promises, justice .... 
5. This is a summary report of a rich and promising account of the 
subject matter of morality. But there are evident deficiencies. It is 
questionable whether Hume's genealogy provides for evil to amount to 
more than too much self-love, too little benevolence, or too little effort or 
predisposition to cultivate the artificial virtues. 10 Again, as is notorious, 
he says too little to connect morality and reason. 11 But three other deficits 
are more closely related to Hume's nescience of the idea of solidarity. 
The first has to do with how little Hume says about what goes on 
where, almost independently of all schooling or ethical formation, human 
beings recognize one another and pre-reflectively respond to one another. 
Secondly and relatedly, not quite enough can be derived from the 
Humean starting point about the source of something which is coeval 
with weak benevolence or fellow-feeling but utterly special, namely our 
primitively prohibitive aversions, the visceral horror that we feel at the 
slaughter of the innocent or the repaying of good with gratuitous evil, 
the indignation that seizes us against the ill-usage of defenceless persons, 
the way our blood runs cold at the sight of unprovoked wounding or 
injury. 
There is a third deficit. Placed where he is, Hume has too little sense 
of what the generalization ofbenevolence in 'public spirit and other social 
virtues of that stamp' may find itself licensed to award to 'winners', or 
what it will be licensed to take away from 'losers', in deliberations directed 
towards the greater happiness.•: Hume is not well placed to foresee what 
will happen to his ideas when they reach the young Bentham, or 
revolutionaries in France, or the Utilitarian sect of the nineteenth century. 
lfHume's 'social virtues', generalized benevolence, public spirit and 
the rest, are not to sponsor problems similar to those that attach to 
consequentialism- if the 'social virtues' are not to be positively dangerous 
to moral subjects whose vital interests will be outweighed by the less 
vital interests of others more numerous than they -, then social virtues 
deserve much more careful demarcation than Hume attempts. Hume's 
own bent, in so far as he faced the sort of questions that are raised by 
utilitarian philosophy, was to insist (as he does in his account of the 
artificial virtues) that 'the whole system of just actions, concurred in by 
the whole society [be) infinitely advantageous to the whole and to every• 
part'Y Moreover, Hume's saying this last thing is all of a piece with his 
conviction that there is something sacred in consent, the consent of all 
persons who are party to the concertment of conduct entailed by the said 
'system'. But that sacredness, like the need for a more exact demarcation 
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of the various social virtues, is something that we need to get from his 
genealogy. He does not show how this is to be achieved. 
6. Hume not only lacks the word 'solidarity'. He has barely 
articulated the need for something at once distinct from natural sympathy 
and benevolence and coeval with them. If we are to see that which is 
altogether distinctive in what Foot wants human solidarity to be, then we 
must gather some conception of it for ourselves by making a traverse of 
our own across the very same ground that Hume travelled and surveyed. 
We need, I think, to redescribe the things that Hume characterized only in 
terms of practices and dispositions grounded in sympathy, self-love and 
natural benevolence and to place them in relation to what flows from the 
phenomenology of primitive pre-reflective recognition. 
7. What goes on when one person finds or happens upon another 
person? In confrontation with the human form, in recognizing another 
person, we recognize (entirely pre-reflectively, however theoretical the 
philosophical description makes things sound) not merely a subject of 
consciousness but a being who will try to make sense of us even as we 
try to make sense of him or her, each of us bringing to bear more or less 
similar expectations, a canon of the reasonable not entirely at variance 
with our own, and a comparable proclivity to reciprocity or retaliation. 
Many different things are simultaneously at work here. Out there in 
reality they seem inextricable. Here though is Simone Weil: 
Anybody who is in our vicinity exercises a certain power 
over us by his very presence, and a power not exercised 
by him alone, that is the power of halting, repressing, 
modifying each movement that our body sketches out. 
If we step aside for a passer-by on the road, it is not the 
same thing as stepping aside to avoid a bill-board. Alone 
in our rooms we get up, walk about, sit down again 
quite differently from the way we do when we have a 
visitor ... But this indefinable influence that the presence 
of another human being has on us is not exercised by 
men [such as one's adversary in warfare] whom a 
moment of impatience can deprive of life, who can die 
before even a thought has a chance to pass sentence 
on them. In their presence people move about as if they 
were not there. Simone Wei I. "The Iliad, or the Poem of 
Force".'4 
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At the end of the citation, Weil begins to describe, in accordance with her 
main purpose, what it is for the expectation of recognition to be in suspense. 
At the beginning she describes the "indefinable influence" it has upon 
one personal being to find in another a subject of the kind of 
consciousness that we ourselves know, or to find "one of us"- one who 
may consent or refuse. To treat a person like a billboard, on the other 
hand, either I must fail somehow to see them or else I have to be ready 
and willing to suspend all the impulses that make possible the recognition 
of a person as a person. 
Consider wilful killing. In mortal combat, the 'indefinable influence' 
in which we are nonnally caught up is suspended.'5 In ordinary life, on 
the other hand, consider how many habits of mind and feeling you have 
to put aside even to contemplate simply doing away with another person 
(to contemplate doing this yourself, I mean). The point is not that these 
habits of mind and feeling cannot be suspended - they have been 
suspended countless millions of times - but the psychic and visceral 
obstacle which will impede anyone who belongs to the mass of humanity 
that Wei! is describing- and the affiliated moral unreasonableness (as I 
should say) of abdicating from them.'6 
8. Back now to Hume. The recognition Weil speaks of is not the 
very same thing as the fellow feeling or primitive benevolence Hume 
speaks of. It is coeval with it. Almost coeval with both there is another 
thing, and this at least we may partly discern inHume. Ifl can recognize 
the other, then he or she can recognize me in the same way. And there 
aren't just two of us who instantiate the human fonn that prompts this 
recognition. There is a whole host. Indeed there is the party of humankind, 
as Hume calls it (Enquiry, IX, part one, Selby Bigge, 275), the party which 
ignores or discourages the attitudes that human beings take up from the 
exclusive viewpoint of self-love, even as it reinforces the willingness of 
each to take up the point of view that shall be 'common to one [person] 
with another'. 
So far so good. But now we come to the next question: in so far 
as human beings keep faith with that which makes them members of the 
pany ofhumankind, how does that infonn and constrain the conduct that 
becomes possible for one member towards other members of that same 
party? If someone keeps faith, how must he or she act in everything that 
can affect other personal beings? How are we to think about this? Putting 
Foot's suggestion that solidarity is the idea we need alongside the 
etymology of the word itself, let us look now to Roman Law as that 
related to agreements that were solidary or in solido. More particularly, 
since it is in French that the word first acquires an ethical sense and that 
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sense only gets into English from the French 'solidarite' 17, let us draw 
upon the version of Roman Law that occurs in the Napoleonic Code 
Civil of 1804.ln the corresponding part of the civil law of the Romans, the 
Latin word 'solidum' means whole or entire. 
9. Two people want to borrow money to buy a house together. 
Their creditors cautiously stipulate that, if one debtor defaults, the other 
will discharge the whole amount. Until it is paid, each of the debtors is to 
be liable for the whole debt. Under this condition, provided that it is 
expressly stipulated, the debtors have so-called passive solidarily. They 
are at one in their exposure to the creditor. They are severally liable as 
well as jointly liable for the whole debt. (The legal relation between the 
debtors themselves is spelled out separately. It need not concern us.) 
So much for passive solidarity. Next we have active solidarity. 
Suppose there are two creditors (say) as well as two debtors and each 
creditor has lent half of the money. Suppose that, for the sake of best 
ensuring the security of their respective loans, the creditors join forces. 
Then they may stipulate that each credilor should be able to demand of 
either debtor that slhe discharge the whole of that which is still owed. 
Under this stipulation, the creditors enjoy acti\•e solidarity. (The legal 
relation between the creditors can be spelled out separately. It need not 
concern us.) 
There is the model. But now let us prescind from debt in the narrow 
sense and prescind from the idea that a person can only play one role. Let 
us prescind from the thought that there can only be solidarity where it 
has been expressly stipulated. On these terms. let us try to reconstruct 
the kind of solidarity that exists among those who recognize one another 
as members of the party of humankind. There is a solidum, some whole 
thing, which every member is entitled to expect from each and every 
other. By the same token, each and every person has the corresponding 
responsibility to anyone or everyone else. But what is this thing? 
When our reconstruction reaches this point you will be reminded of 
the cry of the three musketeers in Dumas's 1844 novel of the same name: 
'Un pourtous et tous pour un'. 18 But, having made the comparison, you 
must also make a contrast. The three (later four) musketeers are friends, 
whereas the members of the party of humankind are mostly strangers. If 
any person can demand of any person the whole of whatever flows from 
the kind of recognition that Weil describes, then the solidum we are 
concerned with must fall well short of what you can only demand of a 
friend. When confronted with extremes of poverty or deprivation, a 
properly directed benevolence may possibly award something that only 
a friend could expect. But our question is this: from out of the blue, so to 
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speak, and of a total stranger who is not a Samaritan, what can you 
reasonably expect? what can you reasonably demand? 
10. In the passage ofWeil we have cited, the first thing that flows 
from the recognition of another person simply as a person, and from the 
indefinable influence that Wei! describes, is negative. As Foot says, a 
space surrounds another; and the preservation of that space forbids 
unprovoked injury, murder, plunder or pillage. Being the sort of creatures 
we are, we apprehend the awfulness of such acts not by inference but 
immediately and directly, indeed viscerally. In so far as we consider these 
as acts we might be forced to do ourselves, it appals us. That is familiar 
enough and all the easier to understand once the phenomena of recognition 
enter into our neo-Humean genealogy. It is no less fundamental than the 
ordinary benevolence that an agent directs at his or her nearest or dearest. 
But now, as regards benevolence, whether directed or generalized, let us 
consider next the implementation of a simply aggregatively justified plan 
for general benefit which will in practice condemn 'the losers' to be 
deprived, if not of their life, then of their livelihood or of their previous 
expectation, such as it was, of satisfying their vital needs. 19 Consider, for 
instance, the forced sacrifice (without the excuse of war) of a whole present 
generation to future generations. Or consider the dogmatic application, 
without regard for that which leads Foot to invoke solidarity, of unqualified 
doctrines of free trade, cash crops for export, wide open markets, and 
economically induced migration or urbanization, along with these things' 
direct consequences as witnessed over the last three or four decades. 
These are the doctrines which some have wanted and may still want to 
project upon the Third World. 
'Always there will be winners and losers', people sometimes say. 
Under one aspect this is a truism; under another it is an unscrupulous 
way of making injury, rapine and injustice sound as ifthey were logically 
inevitable and in no way the responsibility of those who devise the 
proposals that the truism is meant to justify. But look for another plan, 
solidarity will say. Find alternatives. Multiply possible policies. Choose 
more carefully. Try not to add to the many millions of the dispossessed 
we see alrea~y. Would you be responsible for there being yet more? The 
time has come for human beings to be more inventive, more resourceful, 
more sensitive to the issue of compensation or amends, and more patient 
in their grand plans for the reconstruction of the human condition. In 
keeping with that patience, and in defence of anyone or everyone affected, 
can there not be a strident insistence that, as events unfold, there be 
visible to the ordinary human viewpoint, at each and every successive 
stage of human intervention, less blight, less ruin and less devastation? 
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As we grow up, let us listen more sceptically to those who pay tribute to 
"creative destruction". To those who Jove that idea, solidarity will say 
again: it is morally and reasonably impossible for you to recognize each 
human being as owed your abstention from intentional assault and then, 
in your aggregative reasoning, to acquiesce in something seriously 
comparable to intentional assault. Do not the categorical prohibitions 
imported by solidarity have a prior claim over benefits that make their 
appeal only to your simple generalization of benevolence?:o Your 
mechanization of benevolence proves to be seriously at variance with 
the fellow feeling which is the source of that benevolence. Your 
systematization of what begins as a human virtue promises to become an 
attitude of contempt for the root of morality itself. 
I I. We shall come back to the last point. But this is the moment to 
refine ideas about that which solidarity excludes. Let us go back to Hume 's 
story as recently renewed. 
Once personal beings recognize one another as personal beings, 
open themselves to the claims of solidarity, and are party to prohibitive 
aversions of the kinds already described - as well as to sentiments of 
reciprocity, gratitude and the rest-, there is room for such beings to enter 
into closer and closer relations of trust or of mutual dependence. Such 
relations have to sustain and be sustained by ethical dispositions that 
come into being with the concertment we have already described as 
resulting from human beings' acting towards one another as ifby compact 
or mutual understanding. It is only to be expected then that, correlative 
with the artificial virtues, there will be corresponding, so to say artificial, 
obligations or requirements. These too must have a categorical standing. 
Their force will not be conditional upon the agent's choice of end or upon 
anything else. And note too that, once we settle down to enjoy the benefits 
of what Hume calls the 'whole system', we shall often put ourselves into 
a position where a person of solitary, settled independence would never 
put himself, a position where we may be entirely undone if others do not 
keep to their side of the spoken or unspoken understanding that has 
grown up between us. Our dependence on that understanding - once 
supported by the expectation of the sincere consent of those who would 
participate- makes room for an extension (an artificial extension, so to 
say) of the inventory of acts that have the semblance of a direct assault 
by one personal being upon another. Beyond Hume's natural crimes of 
murder or ingratitude but in inescapable analogy with them, we discover 
the artificial crimes- at least some of them directly comparable to assault 
- of betrayal, false promise, fraud, slander, false witness and the rest. 
Where a comparison with assault can be sustained. such acts may pass 
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beyond the valuations bad, disappointing, .... most unfortunate or 
regrellable, disgraceful, lamentable, and trespass upon the same ground 
as murder, rapine, the repaying of good with gratuitous evil. They trespass 
upon the ground marked forbidden, nefastumlnefarium, verboten, 
atasthalon, arrheton. 
12. Now that these categories are assigned their fuller extent and a 
content not special to any particular mode of human civilisation21 , and 
now that we are feeling our way towards their source, the moment has 
come to say more of their impon. Above all, these are deontological 
categories. To some philosophers the deontological appears absurdly 
archaic. But its distinctiveness will appear less strange altogether once 
the original paradigm of the categorically forbidden or nefastum is taken 
to be that which menaces the ethical itself and corrupts its basis in mutual 
recognition, in solidarity and in the possibility of trust in the sacredness 
of certain agreements. It is one thing for the doing of an act to deserve the 
adverse criticism of the ethical. It is another for it to poison the source of 
the ethical itself- or to promise to combine with a multiplicity of similar 
doings to poison it. 
A signal and striking dictum ofthe moral philosopher W.D. Ross was 
"right does not stand for a form of value at all". 22 A similar or greater truth 
would lie, I believe, in the contention that "forbidden does not stand for 
a form of disvalue". In saying this I am not saying, absurdly, that nothing 
bad flows from or resides in acts of criminality. I am saying that the 
original and first work of"forbidden" lies within the deontological as 
such. Either directly or at one remove, the special power of primitive 
prohibition is rooted in the phenomenon ofrecognition.23 See section 7. 
It is celebrated in the kind of sacredness that is sometimes attributed to 
the human person. That sacredness is as real as the forbidden. But I note 
that such a source can lend no plausibility at all to the strange idea that 
the more human beings there are, the better. 
13. Philosophers such as the moral consequentialists are not only 
impatient with the categorically forbidden. They feel a similar impatience 
with considerations that tum crucially upon agency and personal 
responsibility. But it matters to those who are living by the ethic of human 
solidarity that we have been trying to recover or reconstruct not only 
what acts a person does, not only what results from their doing what they 
do, but also in what spirit they and other agents act. In abstraction from 
the act they do, it matters, as Philippa Foot will say, what the quality is of 
a person's will and it matters how much they care about that solidum 
which is owed to anyone or everyone. 
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If the tenns on which we involve ourselves with the ethical are as I 
have now claimed and ifl have discovered the right way to think about 
how it is to be detennined what each and everyone owes to each and 
everyone, then it is clearer still why a human being cannot (ethically or 
reasonably)24 acquiesce in modes of thinking that prescind from our deep-
seated ideas of agency, responsibility or the categorically forbidden/ 
required. Within the framework we are exploring these ideas appear as 
nothing less than structural or constitutive of the ethical as such. In so 
far as I have ventured to pass judgment on certain lines of conduct which 
withhold even the minimum that human solidarity requires, it is this 
framework and the sentiments that the framework helps to explain (and, in 
the explaining, serves to second or support) which embolden me to do 
so. 
14. Solidarity as Foot understands it deserved a name of its own 
and in the end it got one. Lying as it does at the root of the ethical, the 
thing that Foot articulates mobilizes feelings which are ready and waiting 
to impassion us to protect true benevolence from the misappropriations 
of brute force. Both the feeling and the associated demand are facts lying 
beyond judgment or choice (which is not to say that no one will seek to 
opt out from them). No doubt the undifferentiated solidarity of the human 
qua human enables, aids, abets and interlocks with the camaraderie of the 
group; and no doubt it was the widening of the group which opened our 
eyes to see through the once very unfamiliar multifonnity of human 
physiognomy to the oneness ofhumankind.z5 But even ifhuman solidarity 
may appear from some angles indiscernible from the solidarity of the 
group, the thing it points to is something which has always transcended 
the group.26 It points to the innennost and least contestable core of the 
ethical. (See section 9 above.) Looking beyond the prohibitions and 
consequential duties that make up the greater part of the core, one might 
suppose that in many cases the further or more particular care or concern 
one owes to others or can expect to receive from others will depend on 
the power of something that lies outside the innennost core, and is no 
less important for lying there. Such care or concern may arise from the 
promptings of strong and genuine philanthropy or of true internationalism. 
In more everyday cases it will depend on local obligations, duties or 
loyalties which are no less exigent for being local- or depend, as some 
say, on more specific or local solidaritiesz' coexisting with the totally 
general solidarity of the party of humankind. 
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15. That at least is the story I have to tell. But there is another story 
you could have heard in 1909 and will hear more loudly no doubt in 2009, 
which would have it that in the modem age: 
Even though many of the older forms of solidarity 
are melting away, new solidarities are constantly 
emerging. The thing that is so noteworthy is the ever-
widening circle of solidarity through the family, the city, 
the nation, all the way to humanity itself. From this 
widening we have a doubly fortunate result: corporate 
egoism is ennobled by extending itself to the point where 
it embraces the whole ofhumanity; and at the same time 
the clash of conflicting solidarities becomes more and 
more a thing of the past.28 
By this account, dating from 1909 and translated from the words of Charles 
Gide, who was at once an economist and a critical but sympathetic 
promoter of the solidarist ideal of a cooperative republic, it is made to 
appear that the idea of a solidarity ofhumanity was something new to the 
world. It is made to appear that a wider and wider new solidarity of the 
human as such has become the harbinger for a morality that constantly 
disencumbers itself from that which darkens and obscures it. This new 
morality supersedes the solidarities of family, city and nation. Against 
that I have insisted first that the solidarity of the human qua human 
which supports the primarily important prohibitive component of morality 
is not a new thing, and secondly that it can never do duty for everything 
else. Still Jess, in the third place, is it bound to conflict with the more 
specific loyalties and auachments that flow worthily from family, city and 
nation. 29 It offends against the solidarity ofhumankind for one person to 
assail another without provocation or to take away from them that on 
which their life or well-being depends.lt offends against human solidarity 
to neglect the duties of reparation we have towards anyone we have 
harmed in this way, or to neglect the duties (once invoked as the Jaws of 
Zeus) of safe conduct and hospitality towards strangers as strangers.Jo 
Nothing could lie closer to the ethical; but so much more or Jess exhausts 
the solidum that is owed to others simply as members of humankind. 
In the I 00 years since Charles Gide wrote the chapter from which I 
have quoted, we have heard countless times of 'the widening of the 
human circle' as representing an altogether new culmination of moral 
thinking. But not only is there something wrong with the story. It seems 
likely that there is something dangerous in the idea of a human world 
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without evident frontier, limit or horizon. In his second Ulllimely 
Meditation, Nietzsche declares: 
from an infinite horizon [man] returns to himself, to the 
smallest egoistic enclosure and there he must grow 
withered and dry; probably he attains to cleverness, 
never to wisdom. He 'listens to reason', calculates and 
accommodates himselfto the facts, keeps calm, blinks 
and knows how to seek his own or his party's 
advantage in the advantage and disadvantage of 
others. He unlearns shame that is needless .... Precisely 
that is the sense of the cynical demand for the 'total 
surrender of the personality to the world process' ... 
If we see any truth in Nietzsche's finding- ifthe fresh experience of homo 
economictts as he lives (competes) under the care of globalism now reveals 
some prescience on Nietzsche's part- we may think that the more widely 
the circle is extended, the greater the need for more specific loyalties to 
excite more particular benevolence and define more specific obligations, 
and the greater the need for more local conceptions of political morality. 
On the other hand, if we understand the widening of the circle as it seems 
solidarists at the tum of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries and their 
inheritors have been wont to understand it, the more problematic such 
loyalties are bound to appear. Loyalty or attachment will come to be seen 
as arbitrary. And once it seems arbitrary it will seem meaningless. 31 That is 
the price of confusing the universal, categorical but utterly special 
demands of human solidarity with the demands of the ethical as such. 
16. The force of human solidarity is not only distinctive. It is 
commanding. Or so I have claimed. But the question may be put: how can 
something whose existence is utterly contingent, something which is so 
quickly and easily lost in hostile, devastated or corrupted human 
environments, lie at the core of morality? I answer first that foundations 
are not at issue, only roots. But secondly, even if the facts about us that 
make solidarity possible are contingent, this is not to say that the findings 
of the morality that solidarity helps to nourish are contingent. Nor is it to 
say that morality itself is not objective-or that the contingency in question 
can be. for us, a mere contingency. 3~ For the contingency in question is 
the same as the contingency that human persons are the sort of creatures 
they are and have the predispositions that they do. It is not distinct from 
the contingency that we can have morality at all. It may strengthen not 
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weaken us to think how fragile is this thing that solidarity and related 
predispositions make possible. 
17. But how can so slight a thing as I have described play any 
serious part in sustaining morality? Well, how can an atmosphere that is 
to the earth as the thin skin of a large cooking apple is to the rest of the 
apple sustain -despite the poison, smoke and other wastes that people, 
six or seven or eight or nine billion of them, send up into it? We shall see 
if it can. I fit will have to do so, and if it can do so, and if it can go on doing 
so, that too will be contingent. 
18. Human solidarity is a way of being, not a way of arriving at 
something else. It is not an ordinary human pursuit. Its role is to condition, 
to civilize and to humanize human pursuits. 
Ethical ideas are a rare and precious resource, something to be 
husbanded carefully by philosophy.33 Solidarity, slow though it has been 
to come to explicit awareness and open though its demand has proved to 
misstatement, zealotry and philosophical confusion, deserves its proper 
place beside that rare handful of precious ideas which it has taken so 
much labour and so many extremities of human experience to articulate.>~ 
Appendix 
It may be said that, together with solidarity, benevolence and the 
rest, the human constitution which Hume and his admirers speak of is at 
best a statistical construct, a fiction that comes down to us as a residue 
from the epoch, now finally concluded, of essentialist thinking. Such a 
complaint deserves a reply. 
There is an essentialism that sees all species, including that of homo 
sapiens as defined by a set of traits that constitute the nature of their 
members and that determine the natural development of any normal 
individuaJ.35 Let it be conceded outright that an essentialism of this sort 
collides with the fact that any given species, if it is to persist from one 
epoch to the next and surmount constant variation in the material 
conditions of its existence, must embrace within it a mass of individual 
variation. But this concession having been made, I insist that neither the 
fact of genetic polymorphism nor the populationist view of species needs 
to undermine Hume's conception of human constitution. 
Suppose we enumerate some generous plurality of the attributes and 
predispositions that are indispensable to Hume 's account of morality 
and human constitution. Suppose we plot the distribution of each of 
these attributes at this, that or the other degree ofits inherence within the 
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individuals of the human population and we construct the usual bell-
curve for the various lesser and greater gradations of the attribute. 
Suppose that, over and over again, as we review the result for each 
attribute, we find that a small but significant minority ofindividuals recur 
at the leftmost edge of the x-axis (at one 'tail' of the distribution) who 
barely participate at all in the qualities by which Hume sets greatest store. 
Does this imply that the Humean genealogist is describing nothing at all 
that can be reliably depended upon'! No. Only if he were making a mistake 
about the vast generality of human beings would Hume lose the right to 
single out one great 'party of humankind' for whom morality represents a 
natural or normal option (under nonnal or favourable conditions).36 Still 
less does it follow from the existence of exceptions to Hume's account of 
human constitution that there is some serious rival to the ordinary morality 
of human solidarity or some alternative way of being that the human 
collectivity might agree to see as a real alternative to 'fear and danger of 
death' or a life 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'. 
The egoist may try to say, on behalf of himself and those in the left-
hand tail of the distribution, that, within the context of our stand against 
him and our justification of our collective efforts to defend ourselves, it is 
unfair for us to appeal in this way to what we call morality. But what is 
there for him to mean by 'unfair"! 
Notes 
I. Are we speaking then of human rights? Not yet. We are speaking rather 
of the phenomenological-cum-genealogical basis or root for human rights and of 
the indignation (for instance) to which we are moved on the behalf of certain 
sorts of victim. I remark though that, if we are to ground rights in human passions 
and responses (how else can we vindicate them'!), then not all the feelings and 
responses that we appeal to ought to depend already on the thought of rights as 
such. Nor can the ambit ofthe feelings and responses we begin with be confined 
to the cases where a strictly and seriously inalienable general right can be 
established. The ambit of that in which the alll\'f!lltionnels arc found wanting 
(e.g. solidarity, as it will appear) will be wider. See my Needs, Values, Truth 
(Oxford, amended third edition. 2002), p.38, note 45. Sec further below note 19, 
paragraph 2. 
2. For an early use of the word in a non-legal sense, see Mona Ozouf. 
'Fraternity' (especially at pages 700-1), in A Critical Dictionary of the French 
Re-.·olution. ed. Fran~ois Furet and Mona Ozouf (Belknap. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Mass. and London. 1989). 
For a still earlier articulation of something closer to the thing itself that 
concerns us, but unnamed, sec the Declaration des dmits de l'homme et du 
citoyen 1793 (An 1): II y a oppression contre le corps social,lorsqu'un seul de 
ses membres est opprime: il y a oppression contre chaque membre lorsque le 
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corps social est opprime (article 34). There is no corresponding statement in the 
Declaration of 1789, or in that of 1794. Note the logical consequence of the 1793 
statement: lorsqu'un seul mcmbre est opprime, it y a oppression contrc chaque 
membre. 
3. I owe the citation to Dictionnaire culture/ en langue franraise, ( ed. Alan 
Rey, Robert-Sejer Paris 2005). See the entry for 'fratemite'. 
4. All too aptly in this regard, the intellectual historian, J.E.S. Hayward. 
quotes from Julien Benda: 
Pour l'historien des idees des hommes, Ia realite ce n'est 
point ce qu'elles ont ete dans !'esprit de ceux qui les ont 
inventees mais ce qu'elles ont ete dans !'esprit de ceux qui 
lcs ont trahies ... car it est clair qu'une doctrine se propagc 
d'autant plus largement qu'elle est apte a sntisfaire un plus 
grand nombre de sentiments divers. 
See 'Solidarity: the social history of an idea in nineteenth century France', 
/ntemational Review of Social History 4, 1959, pp. 261-284. 
5. 'Morality, Action and Outcome' in T. Honderich, cd. Morality and 
Objectivity, (London, Routledge. 1985). Compare from the same text: 'It has 
been suggested [by the author] that one criterion for a good moral system is that 
it should be possible (just by virtue of what it gives and takes] to demand [some 
recognizant return] from every individu.nl because of the good the system renders 
to him ...• It has also to be such that anyone can conform to it and still live well 
enough in the ordinary, non-moral, sense. This condition may well be what limits 
the demands of altruistic [or aggregatively justified] action; and a whole new 
non-utilitarian enquiry should open here. • The square-bracketed insertions 
registered here were arrived at in discussion with Professor Foot. 
6. For 'consequentialism'/ 'conscquentialist', see below section 13. See 
also my Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosoph)• of Morality, Penguin and 
Harvard, 2006, especially pages 226-227 and chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
Consequentialism is not a mere theory, it is a doctrine that interacts constantly 
on the levels of practice and public justification with a distinctive way of acting 
and being. 
7. Sec Th•e/ve Lectures op.cit., chapters 2 and 3. 
8. "The social virtues must be allowed to have a natural beauty and 
amiableness, which (at first) antecedent to all precept and education recommends 
them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind and engages their affection", Enquiry 
V.i. SelbyBigge,214. 
Here, as before, almost everything presupposes "some benevolence, 
however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human 
kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the sentiments 
of the wolf and the serpent." These particular words are from Burne's Enquiry 
(223). In the Treatise, the working of this spark of friendship and the human 
capacity to care however weakly about the fate of another, is described in terms 
of sympathy, where sympathy is the capacity of one human being to resonate to 
the state of another. (Hume compares this with the way in which the sound of 
one violin string will cause another that is "equally wound up"to sound, however 
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faintly, the very same note.) But a sympathy of this sort will only pull in an 
ethical direction if there is already some spark of friendship, "some benevolence 
however small infused into our bosom." In the E11q11iry (218), Hume is explicit 
on this point. No plausible genealogy ofmornls can escape it. See Twelve Lectures, 
Chapter Two, especially page 38. 
9. I understand such con-ventions or con-currences as comings together or 
runnings together- as convergences of as if concerted conduct- resulting either 
from some initial chance happening which is unrellectively reinforced by the 
immediate perception of a benefit resulting (compare primitive reciprocity and 
the natural noncompact-involving virtue of gratitude) or else from more explicit 
agreement. See 1il•eh•e Lectm-es. page 74. 
N.B. Hume's terminological provisions ('Natural may be opposed either 
to what is IIIIUSIIal, miraculous or artificial'. E11q11iry, Appendix Ill) preserve the 
option for him to say that it is natural for human beings to engage in that which 
involves artifice. Hume exercises this option in one of his letters to Hutcheson: 
'I have never called justice unnatural but only artificial'. See i.33 in J. Y. T. Greig 
(ed.). Letters cifDavid Hume, Oxford 1932. 
I 0. Nothing would prevent Hume from taking counsel from Schopenhauer 
and assigning to Bosheil or malice its own special place among the foundational 
predispositions of human beings. See 1i,·elve Lect11res, Chapter Two, pages 59-
60,64. 
II. If we are constructive, we shall not prolong llumc's campaign against 
reason as his predecessors Clarke and Cudworth misconceive it. Rather, we shall 
enter into the critical-cum-norrnativc study of the ordinary avowable reasons 
(plural) that ordinary human agents of passable good sense, honour and decency 
will appropriate as their reasons to do this. to feel that. or to respond thus or so. 
On an Aristotelian view. there is no other route by which to engage with the most 
fundamental notion of prnctical reason. How else can we remind ourselves oflhe 
ends and means proper to workaday human reason? If Hume will agree that 
ordinary reasonableness so conceived is what survives his critique of Clarke, 
Cudworth eta/., then Aristotle is not (as some would suppose) his opponent but 
his ally. 
For the Aristotelian view ofbare Zweckratio11alitlit and its tenuous claim 
to be any sort of rationality at all, see Nicomadletm Ethics, 1144 a23 following. 
In Aristotle the intellectual virtues presuppose the ethical virtues. which 
presuppose human passions and responses and the ethical regulation of these. It 
is ethical virtue, moreover, that fixes the rational end. See Book VI. chs. 1.2 and 
see 1144a 7-9.11 is a substantial question about rationality not a merely forrnal 
one what the rational end is. See also Twef,·e Lectures. page SO following. 
12. Two or three generations after Hume and. working consciously \\ithin 
the framework llume did not inhabit. John Stuart Mill sees clearly the political 
or economic peril of minorities. whether enfranchised or not, whom the public 
pursuit of the quantitatively greatest happiness may threaten with immiseration 
or near-extinction (sec, for instance, CotJSideratimu 011 Represe11tatiloe Govemmelll 
( 1861 ), Chapter 7). It is a pity that Mill docs not pause to recant or to modify 
(if that were possible) the principle by which all ethical ratiocinations are reduced 
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in theory to the question of the greatest happiness. I remark that, in the presence 
of that principle, the most that can be secured by Bentham's insistence that, in 
the computation of utility, 'every individual is to count for one; no individual for 
more than one' is this: to make more equal the prima facie risk run by each and 
every individual of being sacrificed to some larger good sponsored by generalized 
benevolence. But, as we have seen, Bentham's principle places no limit upon 
what may be demanded of those who will lose by some utility-maximizing 
proposal. 
13. Treatise, Ill, ii, 2. It would be a mistake to see this ruling as a would-be 
check or balance within the calculation of utilities. InHume's account of morals, 
utility does not play a deliberative or calculative role. Pace Bentham and Mill, it 
is a (localized) explanatory notion presupposing his piecemeal cum genealogical 
account of vinuous dispositions and sentiments. It is not a deliberative tool 
within first order morals. Nor yet is it a unitary notion. See Twelve Lectures 
pages 165-7. 
14. As translated by Mary McCarthy in Pendle Hill Pamphlet no. 91 
(Wallingford, Pennsylvania, Pendle Hill Press 1956) page 7.1 choose Simone 
\Veil over numerous others such as Hegel or Levinas who have been concerned 
with the same phenomena because she focuses so closely on the pre-reflective 
and does not intellectualize or moralize the phenomena. She focuses on that 
which precedes the ethical as such and on that which is not a matter of judgment 
or choice. 
I 5. More exactly, it is suspended except in so far as there are some for 
whom, even in the frenzy of danger or emergency, it takes yet more to put that 
influence into abeyance-a fact clearly recognized in the training and drilling of 
military recruits and conscripts. 
16. Concerning reasonableness and unreasonableness, see note II. 
Concerning the reach of human recognition, see below section I 5. 
In the contentions of this paragraph you will recognize a would-be Humean 
version of a Kantian contention. But I am tempted to think that the thing we 
arrive at in this way may explain better than Kant can explain it why, faced with 
the spectacle of an act of deliberate murder, we draw in our breath and gasp, our 
stomach turns. Does the same explanatory power reside in the would-be 
foundational idea of the infringement of the victim's sovereign will? 
An explanation that stans where Weil stans of what is wrong with wilful 
killing, with unprovoked assault, or (on a different level) with repaying good by 
evil, might seem to be unable to rise above the superficial. But, if anything is 
superficial here, maybe it is the opinion that this son of explanation is bmmd to 
be superficial. Fully set fonh, if only that could be achieved, there is no reason 
why the explanation cannot be as deep as the moral facts, as deep at least as the 
idea of a sovereign will. That idea is available to \Veil too but, through her 
approach, it can come more directly from the the phenomena she is concerned to 
describe. 
17. In the ethical sense it reaches England and America in the 1840s. It 
comes through the Fourierists. For a typical Fourierist utterance, far wide of 
formulations such as Foot's, see Hippolyte Renaud, La Soliclarite: Jite Symhetique 
de Ia Doctri11e de Charles Fourier, 1842, page 48. 
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Tousles hommes doivent se ranger a Ia loi: c'est qu'il n'en est 
pas donne a quelques uns d'etre heureux pendant que les 
autrcs souffrent.; c'est que tousles membres de Ia grande 
famille sont lies en un scul faisccau par un grand principe: Ia 
SOLIDARITE ... nous aurons a faire com prendre que les 
interets des hommcs soot en tout point rigoureusement 
idcntiques. 
18. Compare in this connection the citation in note 2 abo\·e from the 1793 
Declaration des Jroits de /'home et de citoyen. Compare also the definition of 
solidarity offered in La So/idarite, a short-lived monthly that appeared in late 
1849: 'La solidarite n'est autre chose qu'un rapport qui rattache et confond les 
intcrets, une sorte d'assurancc mutuelle oil tous sont proteges en general et 
chacun garanti en particulier contre les mauvaises chances. Etre solidaire. c 'est 
etre responsables lcs uns pour les autres'. See Gerald Antoine. Liberte, egolite 
.fraternite:fluctuations d'une db•ise, 1981, Presses de !'Unesco, page 154-5. 
For the possibility that our reconstruction may recapitulate some part of 
the historical evolution of ideas, see further page 149 of Gerald Antoine's same 
work: 
Richelet, Foureticrc, Ia premiere edition du Dictionnaire de 
!'Academic nc connaissent que l'adjectif solidaire, donne 
comme un 'terme de Pratique' ou 'de Palace' ... Lasixieme 
edition de !'Academic (1835) substitue 'Jurisprudence' a 
'Pratique': elle ajoute: 'II se dit figurement des personnes qui 
repondcnt en quclque sorte les unes des autres': enfin, un 
artie le so/idarile y apparait oil sont distinguc!s un usage de 
jurisprudence et un usage, donne comme rare, 'dans le langage 
ordinaire' oil il sc dit 'de Ia responsabilitemutuellequi s'etablit 
entre deux ou plusicurs personnes' ... [1]1 faut en venir au 
Grand Larousse de Ia Langue fran{:aise pour dccouvrir un 
peu plus de substance, et une place faite aux implications 
socialcs du mot ... 
1'!. 'You take my life when you take the means whereby I live'. Merchant 
of Venice, IV, i. 375. Concerning needs, vital and other, see Essay One in my 
Needs, Value, Tntth (amended third edition, Oxford 2002). See also my essay 
·An idea we cannot do without', in The Philosophy of Need, ed. Soran Reader., 
Cambridge 2004. For another sort of commentary on the matters touched upon 
in this section, sec Wangari Maathai, Unbowed. (London; William Heinemann 
2007). 
Let me emphasise that the implementation of an however evil aggregatively 
justified plan need not involve acts a/rea~· recognized as evil, criminal. illegal or 
contrary to human rights. 
20. Constrain, that is. in a way perfectly unaffected by the particular 
purposes an agent wants to pursue. For this, and for the availability to Hume of 
prohibitions and requirements that have such categorical standing. see Twel1·e 
Lectures. pages 85. 92-4. 
To one who asks how far the idea of human solidarity has now carried us 
beyond Humc. I should suggest that they consider the judgments that Hume 
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passes and the basis for the various judgments that he passes on historical 
events, persons, and characters in his HisiOIJ' of England. See for instance his 
reflections on the treatment of Joan of Arc (1431) at chapter XX or the judgments 
that he passes in XXIII upon the events of the reign of Richard the Third. 
lmplicil in these judgments may one not discern an however distant ideal for 
human life not immeasurably far from that ofFootean solidarity? 
21. Hume sees the scheme of conventions and requirements as 
presupposing artifice (hence as 'artificial'). But that leaves him room to insist 
that this is an artifice by which it is na1ural for creatures as unself-sufficient as 
we are to shape our life together. See note 9, paragraph 2. 
22. See Twel\•e Leclures, page 247. 
23. Once we understand 'forbidden', we can define that which one 
categorically must do as that which it is categorically forbidden not to do. Such 
an equivalence well brings out the greater contestability of claims concerning that 
which it is said one must positively do (rather than avoid doing). I remark in 
· passing that I have not shown or wanted to show (absurdly) that all categorical 
obligations are generated within the province of solidarity-only that that province 
exhibits striking and cogent examples. 
Conspicuous among those who are reluctant to take the deontological for 
what it is are consequentialists. Consequential isis are not distinguished by holding 
some monopoly in the consideration of consequences. Everyone thinks 
consequences matter. What then distinguishes them? In the identification and 
description of alternative 'outcomes' through the evaluation of which they expect 
practical decision to be arrived at, conscquentialists either refuse to deploy the 
full range of ethical categorizations or else fail to engage with the real nature and 
variety of our deontological-cum-agential ideas. Conscquentialism is a pervasive 
feature of twentieth-century thought, and all of a piece with a conception of 
rationality to which it can appear {as it does to Robert Nozick in A nan: h)\ Slale 
and UJopia, New York, Basic Books, 1974, p.30) 'irrational that one be prohibited 
from violating a constraint (from doing something forbidden or nefaslum] when 
such a violation will prevent more of the same type of constraint from being 
violated [i.e. prevent more nefasla from occurring)'. It is all of a piece with a 
conception of rationality to which it can appear that there is nothing so bad that 
rationality will not routinely require you to do it in order to prevent others from 
doing yet more ofit. Solidarists ofFoot's persuasion will of course find themselves 
a conception of rationality less reckless, less reductive, more perceptive and 
more meticulous than this. See note II. 
24. See note II. See Twel,·e Leclures, pages 206-9 and see the index under 
"reason'. 
25. No doubt the widening of the group also helped to disturb the quietism 
or fatalism that obstructed almost all practical efforts to follow through upon the 
recognition by one human being of another human being as a human being. On 
related matters, see Peter Garnsey, Ideas ofSim·eiJ'from Aristotle Jo Augusti11e 
(Cambridge 1996), Cbs. 5, 6 and Conclusion. 
26. See for instance Paul, Epistle to the Galatians, 3:28, Epistle Jo the 
Romans, 12:4-5. On SL Paul, see Garnsey. op.cit. Ch. II. 
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27. The Oxford English Dictio11ary gives as one of its definitions of 
solidarity (taken in a sense well downwind from the origin in Roman Law): the 
fact or quality, on the part of communities, etc., of being perfectly united or at 
one in some respect, esp. in interests, sympathies, or aspirations. 
28. See Charles Gide and Charles Rist. Hisroire des doctri11es economiques, 
Paris 1909, Book V, Chapter iii, p.648. Citation from 1947 edition. 
29. I say worthily. This is an important qualification. It is related that in 
the Corsica of the nineteenth century group-solidarities still demanded that each 
member of a group be sworn to avenge the death of any other member of his 
group by taking the life of a member of the hostile group from which the murderer 
came. No one who defends the idea of local solidarity will want to defend this 
sort of solidarity. The way out from vendetta is not some further solidarity. but 
wergeld or blood-price. See below, note 33. 
30. Here one finds that which is most incontestable in the idea of a 
specifically human right. By not invoking that idea explicitly. yet furnishing 
materials by which claims of rights might be tested. I think I create a more secure 
place for it. See note I. 
31. Alasdair Macintyre has made this point forcefully and in a variety of 
connections. Sec, for instance, p. 240fT., in "Politics. Philosophy and the Common 
Good'', in The Macintyre Reader, ed. K .Knight. 
32. See Tweh·e Lectures, page 120. 
33. In various ways Bernard Williams made this contention many times. It 
applies equally, ifin different ways. to ideas that arc discovered and to ideas that 
are invented. The idea of solidarity itself is not so much invented as discovered 
-even if we need to think about it more explicitly in order to follow it through. 
For an idea that was invented. think of the idea of blood-price or wergeld. In the 
west, the first mention of it will be found in Homer's account of the shield of 
Achilles, in Iliad, book 18. lines 497ff .. 
34. For their comments. suggestions or encouragement I want to thank 
especially V eronique Munoz-Darde. Arnold Burms, Martin Stone, John Tasioulas 
and Anthony Price. 
35. See Elliott Sober, 'Evolution. Population Thinking and Essentialism', 
Philosophy of Science, 47, 1980. pages 350-83. For an account of thing-kinds 
that seeks to dissociate their identification from the enumeration ofthe properties 
of their members and seeks at the same time to undo the supposedly necessary 
association between Hilary Putnam's deictic strategy for natural kind words and 
microphysical reduction, see my Sameness and Substance Renewed (CUP 200 I) 
pages 79-81. 
36. Biologists tell us that an Englishman. say, and a Chinaman. say, will be 
genetically closer to one another than two apes chosen at random from the same 
tract of forest. But the point in the text does not depend on that. 
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